The use and application of probabilities

II. The use and application of probabilities.

Shall not go further into the nature of probable evidence, nor inquire why likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far analogical reasoning can be reduced to a system; but shall only show how just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is.

• 1. In determining our judgments and practice.
  • 1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.
  • 2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.
  • 3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive.
• 2. In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s government.
  • 1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the Bible, as we do in Nature.
  • 2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by him.
  • 3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author.
  • 4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.
  • 5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are not applicable, is no better.
  • 6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be right.
  • 7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.
• 3. In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it,
  • 1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and Ruler.
    • —There are no presumptions against this, prior to proof.
    • —There are proofs:—from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.
    • —The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.
  • 2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world might have been made and governed.
    • —Such prating would amount to this:
      • · All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they could be.
      • · Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.
      • · Should have been secured in their happiness.
      • · All punishments avoided.
    • —It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties for such speculations.
  • 3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to ends; and may conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness; but of the means of producing these in the highest degree, we are not competent judges.
    • —We know not the extent of the universe;
    • —Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.
    • —We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other.
    • —As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end.
  • 4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God’s conduct, we must study what is.
    • —Discovering general laws.
    • —Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches us to expect.