DISSERTATION II. The Nature of Virtue (4)

[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told about Hades, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.” Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[73] See Dissertation II.

[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argument a fortiori, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that he sees, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their understanding, but deny his moral ones, because their hearts are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as to this life, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not always bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were the only reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have obvious triumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly deprives him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language of Robert Hall,[A] would be “the only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”

[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[78] Isa. lx. 21.

[79] P. 109.

[80] P. 110, &c.

[81] P. 111, &c.

[82] P. 118, &c.

[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.

[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, Musæi Disput.: Holtzsfusii Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: Selden de Laps. Angelorum: Stapferi Inst.: Witsii Econom. Fœd.: Bate’s Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: Calcott on the Fall: Shuckford on the Creation of Man: Manton’s Sermons: South’s do.: Toplady’s do.: Pearson on the Creed: Le Clerc’s Diss.: Henly’s Dissert.: Kennicott on the Tree of Life: and Fabricius de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]

[85] [The evils of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show that all suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]

[86] Chap. ii.

[87] See Sermons preached at the Rolle, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”—Dr. Chalmers.]

[89] [Shall we be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, but still ourselves. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]

[90] Part II. chap. v.

[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as Chalmers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:—that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”]

[92] [It comes to this:—good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the results of self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]

[93] [They are an answer, but a cavil remains,—viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in degree, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could teach this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]

[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]

[95] [Consult Millman’s Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: Priestley’s Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and Whately’s Pol. Econ., sec. 5.]

[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]

[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. But habits of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the principles of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon the ratio between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites. Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”—Prof. Fitzgerald.]

[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.—See p. 131.

[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole destiny!It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. Ascetic acts are only useful as means, and so long as they are ascetic (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only as discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]

[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler of course does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell suddenly, no less in his state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out how much disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be gainsayed.Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with God.]