DISSERTATION II. The Nature of Virtue (8)

[295] By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity; which is absurd: but, notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true.

[296] P. 141, &c.

[297] Prov. xx. 27.

[298] Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106.

[299] John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.

[300] P. 258, &c.

[301] Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146.

[302] Locke, pp. 146, 147.

[303] Locke, p. 152.

[304] See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Podwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.

[305] [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is called The common-sense school of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be any doubt that Reid, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his great merit.”—Fitzgerald.]

[306] This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,[A] and is made use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding and condemning] upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.

[A] Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.

[307] Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία—ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.

[308] P. 145.