Reformed Epistemology by Cornelius Van Til
Kant vaguely felt that, after all, there was dualism in his epistemology. He did leave room for the possibility of a higher form of existence but did not leave room for the possibility of a genuine knowledge of that higher form. The noumena may or may not exist. At any rate we have no valid knowledge of them. Kant's subjectivism shut him up within a vicious circle. The result of his dualistic metaphysics was his dualistic epistemology. Or should it be put the other wayaround? The dualism in his epistemology between intellectual and nonintellectual knowledge, it seems, is the result of his dualistic metaphysic. It was an essential rationalism that Kant fails to shake off. Such a rationalism is suicidal. It lives by the negation of non-rational knowledge. It can not allow that any but intellectual knowledge is true knowledge. It cannot allow that there can be knowledge of particulars. Then how can we get to the knowledge of universals?
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